

Russia's Cold War Perspective on Missile Defense in Europe

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Russia's opposition to the U.S. proposal to locate missile defense assets in Central Europe is primarily responsible for the controversy currently surrounding this initiative within Europe. How should Russia's objections be interpreted and what should be done about them?

The U.S. Missile Defense Program

In 2001, the United States took a decision to build and deploy a capability to defend against a limited long-range ballistic missile attack. The United States primarily is concerned about the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat from states of proliferation concern¹, particularly North Korea and Iran. From the beginning, the United States has made clear that its goal is to defend not only the United States against such missile threats but also its allies, including its European allies².

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¹ In the United States, such countries generally are referred to as "rogue states," whereas in France the typical term is "états préoccupants".

² George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University", Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, May 1, 2001 (available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/print/20010501-10.htm>).

The United States has moved forward with determination to achieve these goals, including through its withdrawal from the outdated constraints of the ABM Treaty; adoption of a spiral development approach to missile defense; conclusion of agreements with the United Kingdom and Denmark to upgrade early-warning radars at Fylingdales and Thule, respectively; establishment of cooperative development efforts with Japan, Israel, and other nations; and the deployment of radars and ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. The United States now has a limited operational capability to defend its territory against a simple ballistic missile threat³. That capability is focused on defending the United States against the North Korean threat while also providing coverage against the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat from Iran⁴.

Enhancing missile defense capabilities against the emerging Iranian threat is a logical progression for the U.S. ballistic missile defense program. Iran has an active ballistic missile development program underway, assisted by North Korea⁵. Just last summer, Iran flight tested short- and medium-range ballistic missiles⁶. Iran could possess ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States and Europe by 2015; intermediate-range missiles able to range much of Europe could be available earlier⁷. It is impossible to say with certainty, though, just when Iran will have such capabilities; they may emerge later—or earlier. North Korea launched a three-stage Taepodong-1 missile over Japan in 1998, when analysts thought North Korea's program was far less advanced⁸. Iran, of course, also is aggressively pursuing an industrial-scale uranium enrichment capability in defiance of the United Nations Security Council. It is the

³ Charles McQueary, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, US Department of Defense, testimony during the hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, subject: Ballistic Missile Defense Programs, Washington, DC, April 11, 2007.

⁴ U.S. Missile Defense Agency, "European Ballistic Missile Defense, Site Initiatives", 07-MDA-2429, April 17, 2007, p. 4.

⁵ For a succinct discussion of North Korean assistance to Iran's ballistic missile defense program, see Paul Kerr, "Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation," *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2007 (available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/IranNK.asp?print).

⁶ U.S. Missile Defense Agency, pp. 2-3.

⁷ This statement on Iranian long-range missiles is based on a recent U.S. Department of State (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs) Fact Sheet, "U.S. Missile Defense", Washington, DC, April 16, 2007 [available at <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/83119.htm>]. That statement is consistent with a much earlier but more detailed assessment of Iran's emerging ballistic missile capabilities found in "The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to the United States Through 2015", Robert D. Walpole, U.S. National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, Statement for the Record to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (as prepared for delivery), September 21, 2000. Walpole's statement also indicates it is likely that Iran would test an intermediate-range ballistic missile by 2010.

⁸ As discussed, for example, in "North Korea's Ballistic Missile Programme", Institute for International Strategic Studies, as accessed on April 20, 2007 (available at <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-programme>)

prospect of Iran mating nuclear warheads with long-range ballistic missiles within less than a decade that is most disturbing.

A U.S. Proposal to Protect Europe

Europe currently has no defense against long- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The missile defense assets that the United States proposes to locate in Central Europe (a mid-course radar in the Czech Republic and 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland), working in conjunction with other elements of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system, would provide Europe with its first defensive capability against such threats. The United States has offered to deploy these assets at its own expense and aims to have them in place by 2013⁹, which hopefully will precede Iran's ability to hold Europe and the United States at risk with long-range missiles.

The missile defense assets that the United States proposes to place in Central Europe also would enhance the protection that existing assets already provide the United States against the emerging Iranian long-range missile threat. This is an important point. As Dan Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, recently explained, "The United States can defend its own national territory without the deployment of these 10 interceptors in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic. We can do it without it. However, it does us no good to be secure, or it does us little good to be secure if our chief partner in the world -- Europe -- is insecure. We learned through 50 years, after 1945, that ultimately security for the transatlantic community must be indivisible"¹⁰. Central Europe provides the optimal location to protect both Europe and the United States from missiles launched from the Middle East¹¹.

The United States has been at pains to explain to all concerned, not least to Russia, that it has neither the intent nor the capability to defend against the Russian ballistic missile force. Indeed, for reasons of physics and geography, the missile defenses that the United States proposes to locate in Central Europe would have no capability against a long-range ballistic missile launched from Russia against the United States; the interceptors simply could not catch such a missile¹². Russian assertions that the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe is a threat to Russia and to

⁹ LTG Henry A. Obering, Director, U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Foreign Center Press Briefing, Washington, DC, February 22, 2007 [available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/80958.htm>].

¹⁰ Dan Fried, Remarks at Atlantic Council of the United States Conference on Missile Defense in Europe Washington, DC, April 19, 2007 [available at: http://www.acus.org/Missile_Defense_in_Europe_Daniel_Fried.asp].

¹¹ U.S. Missile Defense Agency, p. 1. Some southern European countries are located too close to the Middle East to be targeted by long- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles launched from Iran. Those countries are, however, at risk from shorter-range Iranian missiles. See also U.S. Department of State (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs) Fact Sheet, "U.S. Missile Defense Cooperation with NATO and Russia", Washington, DC, April 16, 2007 (available at: <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/83123.htm>).

¹² U.S. Missile Defense Agency, pp. 2, 8.

strategic stability are false. Thinly veiled Russian threats to target European nations if the U.S. missile defense proposal is implemented are crude throwbacks to Soviet tactics to divide the United States from its European allies.

Russia's Cold War Perspective

Why is there such divergence between the U.S. and Russian perspectives of the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe? A logical and fundamental explanation is that Russia continues to view the United States and NATO as rivals, at best, and even as adversaries. While the United States and its NATO allies want to enlist Russia as a partner in countering contemporary security threats arising mainly from outside of Europe, Russia appears more interested in improving its strategic situation vis-à-vis the western alliance. Russia may well see the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe, put forward at a time when anti-Americanism is high in Europe and around the globe, as an opportunity to divide the United States from its European allies and to strengthen its hand in the Euro-Atlantic area.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a fledgling democracy in Russia, the United States and its NATO allies moved to establish a qualitatively new relationship with the former rival based on democracy and security cooperation. With Russia, they hoped to transform the Euro-Atlantic area into a zone of peace, freedom, and prosperity. They reoriented NATO's security focus away from Russia and to existing and emerging threats in other areas, particularly those arising from rogue regimes, failing states, extremist ideologies, and poverty. Russia, the allies hoped, would be a full partner in countering these contemporary threats¹³.

While Russia formally ascribed to the NATO vision for the Euro-Atlantic area, the evidence strongly suggests that it never fully bought into this vision, at least as NATO has interpreted it, and perhaps even views it as a cover to keep Russia down. Whereas the United States and its European allies view NATO (and European Union) enlargement as a means to encourage and consolidate peace, democracy and prosperity in those parts of Europe formerly behind the "Iron Curtain", Russia views it as an encroachment upon its traditional sphere of influence and even a potential threat to its security. Whereas the United States and at least some of its NATO allies have concluded that missile defense against long-range missiles is part of an essential response to the proliferation of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities to rogue regimes and unstable regions, Russia has seen it foremost as a growing challenge to its strategic capabilities. Perhaps most frustrating for Russia has been its inability, at least to date, to do more than protest these developments: despite strong Russian opposition, NATO enlarged into Central and

¹³ "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality", Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, Rome, Italy, May 28, 2002 [available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b020528e.htm>]

Eastern Europe, including the three Baltic countries, and the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty.

Domestically, democracy in Russia is being steadily rolled back toward a more traditional authoritarian rule. Internationally, Russia has aligned with China to balance U.S. power. In that regard, both appear to have subordinated their respective concerns about Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs to their more important goal of checking U.S. influence by blocking U.S.-led efforts in the United Nations Security Council to impose stronger sanctions on those states of proliferation concern. Russia also has demonstrated its willingness and ability to manipulate its immediate neighbors' and western European nations' dependence on Russian gas supplies.

This is not to say that Russia does not have an understandable basis for the direction it is heading. One can understand that a country twice invaded from the west over the last century and that fell suddenly from superpower to mid-tier power less than two decades ago would view the western alliance with suspicion. One must also recall that the perceived enormity of the technological and economic challenge posed by Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative provided a significant impetus to the Soviet Union's final dissolution¹⁴. Russians' excitement about their newfound political freedom following the dissolution of the Soviet Union soon was marred by the daily struggles of existence in a poor and chaotic society, lending appeal to the relative order later provided by the increasingly authoritarian current regime (an order very much assisted by a dramatic rise in the price of Russian energy exports). The military might demonstrated by the United States in Iraq in both 1991 and 2003, coupled with the United States' disregard of Russia's opposition to the latter invasion, reinforced Russia's inherent concerns about U.S. power and gave it common cause with China in checking that power. Yet, one can understand the sources of Russia's behavior without endorsing or indulging that behavior.

How is Russia's deep-seated concern about the power of the United States and NATO manifested in the current controversy over the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe? First, Russia asserts that the proposed U.S. system would pose a threat to Russia, upset strategic stability, and provoke an arms race¹⁵. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei

¹⁴ This view, though, is not held as widely as it once was.

¹⁵ For example, Russian General Vladimir Popovkin, commander of Russian space forces, was quoted by ITAR-TASS news agency on January 22, 2007, as saying, "our analysis shows that the location of the US base would be a clear threat to Russia. ... The radar in the Czech Republic would be able to monitor rocket installations in central Russia and the Northern Fleet". (*Space War*, January 22, 2007 [available at: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_To_Start_Talks_On_Eastern_Europe_Missile_Defence_System_999.html]). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was quoted by Reuters on March 27, 2007, as stating, "What risks do we see in this U.S. project? In the first place, it will lead to an erosion of strategic stability. Also the balance in global politics can be put in danger" (Louis Charbonneau, "Russia slams missile shield, wants talks with

Lavrov even has suggested that the United States may deploy interceptor launch facilities in Central Europe only to later replace the interceptors with offensive missiles¹⁶. Such assertions invoke Cold War themes of destabilizing missile defenses and inexorable arms racing. The evident intent is to rekindle and mobilize Cold War-style fears among the European populace to forestall this proposed U.S. response to contemporary security threats. Second, prominent Russian civilian and military leaders have threatened to target European nations if the United States deploys its missile defense system in Europe. Russian generals have highlighted Russia's ability to strike any U.S. missile defense facilities located in Central Europe and, thereby, those nations themselves¹⁷. Senior Russian officials also have reiterated an earlier threat to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which would permit Russia to once again hold all of western Europe at risk of nuclear devastation within minutes with SS-20-type missiles¹⁸. The evident objective of this line is intimidation. Third, Russian officials assert that the United States did not adequately inform or consult Russia before moving ahead with its missile defense plans for Central Europe¹⁹. This exploits the view prevalent among many Europeans that the United States is unilateralist and recklessly so.

U.S.," Marcy 27, 2007, Reuters [available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSI2735222720070327?feedType=RSS>]). Russian President Putin said at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, "Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do". (Vladimir Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, Munich, Germany [available at: <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179>])

¹⁶ In Charbonneau's article, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is quoted by Reuters as asserting on March 27, 2007, "The missile shafts needed for the interceptor missiles copy in a dangerous way the facilities for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. What will find its way into these shafts in five to 10 years[?]"

¹⁷ Vladimir Isachenkov, of the Associated Press, "Russian general warns Poland, Czech Republic over U.S. missile defense system", February 19, 2007, appearing in *The Seattle Times* [available at: <http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/2003579491webmissiles19.html>]. Russian General Nikolai Solovotsov, commander of Russian strategic missile forces, is quoted in Isachenkov's article as warning on February 19, 2007, "If the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic take such a step ... the Strategic Missile Forces will be capable of targeting these facilities if a relevant decision is made".

¹⁸ The *Financial Times* reported that Russian Army Chief of Staff General Yury Baluyevsky said on February 15, 2007, that Russia may withdraw from the INF Treaty if the U.S. went ahead with its missile defense plans for Central Europe. See Demetri Sevastopulo, Neil Buckley, Daniel Dombey, and Jan Cienski, "Russia threatens to quit arms treaty," *Financial Times (FT.com)*, February 15, 2007 [available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/289ed728-bd26-11db-b5bd-0000779e2340.html>].

¹⁹ Charbonneau. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is quoted in Charbonneau's article as saying in response to U.S. assertions that it had repeatedly informed Russia of its missile defense plans, "At a minimum, we need to have a serious debate about the fundamental issue and not just briefings which provide no answers to specific questions".

The Reality

The reality is quite different than what Russians are asserting. Since it is not physically possible for the U.S. missile defense assets proposed for Central Europe to intercept Russian missiles launched against the United States, there is no objective basis for asserting that the proposed missile defenses pose any threat to Russia or upset strategic stability. And that does not even consider the fact that such a small number of ground-based interceptors shown to be effective only against a simple, limited ballistic missile attack could pose no significant counter to Russia's hundreds of sophisticated, long-range ballistic missiles, even if they were physically able to track and intercept such missiles. As NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer stated following meetings at NATO on April 19, 2007, that discussed the U.S. missile defense proposal, "Ten interceptors will not, cannot and will not affect the strategic balance and 10 interceptors can also not pose a threat to Russia"²⁰.

To the extent that Russia may truly be concerned about the implications of defensive systems for strategic stability, it almost certainly would be with regard to what it fears the overall U.S. missile defense program might someday be capable of rather than the capabilities of what the United States is proposing for Central Europe²¹. On the basis of available evidence from the U.S. ballistic missile defense development and testing efforts, and the types of countermeasures already available to a nation like Russia (e.g., maneuverable warheads), it is a highly unlikely and at most a very distant prospect that a meaningful capability against a large and advanced ballistic missile force would be achievable. Moreover, it would take a very different strategic context than currently exists to motivate the United States even to pursue such an elusive capability. The current and foreseeable reality is that the deployment of defensive capabilities against a limited number of ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East will reinforce stability by deterring and, if necessary, defeating rogue nation missile threats or actual attacks.

The Russians have not and can not offer a serious case to substantiate Foreign Minister Lavrov's odd suggestion that the United States might switch out interceptors for offensive missiles down the road (something which would be difficult to do, in any case)²². Given Russian threats to withdraw from the INF Treaty, perhaps they are just mirroring their own strategic outlook. The threat to withdraw from the INF Treaty, like the saber-rattling about targeting U.S. missile defense facilities deployed in

²⁰ "NATO chief dismisses Russia fears", *BBC News*, April 19, 2007 [available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6570533.stm>].

²¹ For example, on February 19, 2007, General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russia's strategic missile forces, expressed concern about the military implications of future improvements to the proposed U.S. missile defense system for Central Europe (Isachenkov).

²² U.S. Missile Defense Agency, p. 4. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has explained that any conversion of interceptor silos for offensive missiles would require extensive modifications and could not be done quickly or easily.

Central Europe (and, hence, those Central European nations themselves), are Soviet-style intimidation tactics successfully (if not easily) withstood and discredited during the Cold War.

Russian assertions that the United States had kept them in the dark about its missile defense plans are disingenuous. As Daniel Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, explained during a detailed missile defense briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington, DC, on February 22, 2007, "Everything that has been briefed to you today has been explained both to NATO allies and in the NATO-Russia Council and to the Russians bilaterally in a series of detailed discussions, both at high level and at expert level, and these discussions are going to continue"²³. Five days later, John Rood, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, made similar observations and added, "Russian officials, and their experts, fully understand the technical limitations and parameters of the proposed defensive capabilities. There is a huge discrepancy between the tone of the conversations with Russian officials in private consultations and their recent public statements"²⁴. U.S. officials nonetheless have acknowledged that additional information about U.S. missile defense plans will need to be provided to both Russians and Europeans to address their concerns, and have pledged to do so. U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman so indicated on April 20, 2007, following further discussions that day of the missile defense issue in both the NATO-Russia Council and in a special meeting of NATO officials²⁵.

It also should be noted that the United States has been offering for more than a decade to cooperate jointly with Russia on missile defense, including strategic missile defense. The United States' desire for joint cooperation was reiterated as recently as U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' late April 2007 trip to Moscow to discuss the missile defense issue. As Secretary Gates said, "The key to this is cooperation. We would like to have the Russians as partners in this process. We would like to share information with them. We are prepared to co-locate radars with them"²⁶. Russia, however, has been unwilling to take up the U.S. offers, at least as they concern strategic missile defense. As Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov said on April 20, 2007, "As for possible cooperation

²³ Foreign Center Press Briefing, February 22, 2007.

²⁴ John Rood, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, 'Remarks to the 8th Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Missile Defense Conference, London, United Kingdom, February 27, 2007 [available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/81242.htm>].

²⁵ DPA, "NATO backs US missile defence as Russia talks tough (3rd Roundup)", Europe News, April 19, 2007 [available at: http://news.monstersandcritics.com/europe/news/article_1293841.php/NATO_backs_US_missile_defence_as_Russia_talks_tough_3rd_Roundup].

²⁶ Thom Shanker, "Russia Cool to U.S. Call for Cooperation on Missile Defense", *The New York Times*, April 23, 2007, Section A, Column 3, page 6 [available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/world/europe/24gates.html?ex=1335067200&en=e2f44ebf45ff15b4&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print>].

in strategic anti-missile defense, honestly speaking, I see no reasons for that”²⁷.

For historical and other reasons, Russia may truly perceive the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe to be part of a larger effort intended to significantly degrade their strategic nuclear deterrent and further disadvantage them vis-à-vis the United States and NATO, despite the objective reality. Yet, it would be naive and dangerous for Europeans to forego the protection from real threats emerging from the Middle East that the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe affords in an effort to placate Russia’s concerns. As long as it continues along its current direction, Russia’s strategic interests are more divergent than convergent with Europe’s. The United States and NATO must not give up on Russia, but they must also continue to stand together firmly to protect and advance their shared interests and values.

The Way Ahead

What, then, is to be done about Russia’s opposition to the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe?

The United States and its NATO allies need to remain united in the face of the Russian effort to divide them. In particular, the Europeans must not allow themselves to be intimidated by Russian threats. That would establish a terrible precedent and only invite more of the same. The strength of the NATO alliance for all its members always has rested on their unity and their confidence in the others’ commitment and capabilities to fulfill their defense obligations to one another. This proved effective against a powerful Soviet military threat; it also can be effective against whatever threats Russia can pose today, the more worrisome of which may pertain to the security of energy supplies than to military action.

The United States and its NATO allies must not forego the opportunity to provide a timely defense against the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat emanating from the Middle East, particularly Iran. Missile defenses are not the end-all solution to this threat, but they are an essential element of a layered response that also includes diplomacy, denial (e.g., interdiction), other forms of defense, strike capabilities, and the capacity to manage the consequences of an attack. Missile defenses contribute to dissuasion of proliferation and deterrence of attack by undermining an adversary’s confidence in the utility of acquiring or employing ballistic missiles. Missile defenses may also provide the only means by which the United States or its allies can avoid the carnage of a weapons of mass destruction attack from an adversary who will not be deterred while

²⁷ “No Reason for Russian-U.S. Missile Defense Cooperation – Top Russian Official,” *Mosnews.com*, April 20, 2007 [available at:” <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2007/04/20/noreasons.shtml>].

correspondingly preserving their flexibility in how to respond to such an attack.

The United States must continue to be as transparent as possible with Russia about the capability of and intent behind its missile defense plans for Europe. It may not be possible to assuage fully Russia's suspicions about the U.S. missile defense efforts, but regular and robust consultations should at least help bound Russia's suspicions and constrain its response.

The United States and NATO should continue their longstanding efforts to make Russia part of the solution vice part of the problem in countering threats from states of proliferation concern, including by continuing to solicit their material participation in long-range and theater missile defense programs. Russia could be more confident of its knowledge of what United States and NATO missile defense programs are capable of and could have greater scope to influence those programs if they would more fully engage at the operational and technical level. Russia could make valuable technical contributions to the development of more effective long-range missile defenses that protect it, Europe, and the United States. Russia is, after all, the only nation that has had a longstanding, operational defensive capability against long-range ballistic missiles, albeit one that utilizes nuclear-tipped interceptors vice the kinetic (hit-to-kill) interceptors used in the modern U.S. systems.

Finally, the United States and its NATO allies should continue to ensure that their respective missile defense initiatives are pursued in a complementary manner so that they afford maximum, layered defense of all allies against all ranges of missile threats. They need to do this without holding progress in any one program or area hostage to delays in another since the security of all allies is improved the earlier that missile defense capabilities against any spectrum of the threat are available. The U.S. and NATO missile defense efforts already are on complementary tracks. NATO has recognized the threat to allies from missiles of all ranges; agreed that missile defense for NATO territory, including against longer-range missiles, is technically feasible; and tasked further work on the political-military implications of missile defense. The United States is proposing to extend to many allies via bilateral arrangements with two the protection afforded by the long-range aspects of its national program, while NATO is actively pursuing capabilities to defend deployed forces against shorter- and medium-range missiles through its Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme. Because U.S.-developed concepts and technology are central to the missile defense efforts of both NATO and the United States (only because the United States has been most active in this area and plays a key role in NATO missile defense efforts), there is little chance that U.S. and NATO missile defense initiatives will progress in a non-interoperable or complementary way, even if they progress at different rates. Indeed, U.S. Missile Defense Agency Director LTG Obering

has stated that the United States will ensure command and control compatibility between the U.S. and NATO missile defense efforts²⁸.

For those in Europe and elsewhere who have reacted to the controversy over the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe by calling for a NATO-wide solution, the title of NATO's press release following the Alliance's special session of April 19, 2007, on the U.S. proposal is instructive: "NATO united on missile defence approach." As NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer is quoted in that release, "There is absolutely a shared threat perception. Allies all agree a threat from ballistic missile exists"²⁹.

The U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe offers the United States and its European allies an opportunity to achieve a timely defensive capability against a limited long-range ballistic missile attack from the Middle East. That capability could someday save many lives. It certainly would reduce allies' vulnerability to coercion by states of proliferation concern armed with nuclear-tipped, long-range ballistic missiles. To achieve that capability, the allies must recognize and resist Russia's Cold War perspective on the U.S. missile defense proposal for Central Europe.

Les opinions exprimées ici n'engagent que la responsabilité de leur auteur.

²⁸ DPA, "NATO backs US missile defence as Russia talks tough (3rd Roundup)", *Europe News*.

²⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO united on missile defence approach", April 19, 2007 [available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/04-april/e0419a.html>].

