China has engaged in a dramatic buildup of its nuclear forces over the past decade. While much of the attention on China’s new nuclear arsenal has focused on its development and expansion of its strategic nuclear triad, this growth has also included significant numbers of theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems. These forces are not capable of reaching the U.S. mainland but can range U.S. and allied forces and bases across strategically significant swathes of the Indo-Pacific.
This research project assessed the growing threat to the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies posed by these systems. It then considered ways and means to counter and deter this challenge. It also considered possible risk reduction options. The study team organized its work around three main research questions:
1. What is the role of China’s theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems in its strategies and plans for countering U.S. intervention within a future Indo-Pacific security crisis or conflict?
2. What “integrated deterrence” strategy or strategies:
a. Can counter China from utilizing these systems to realize strategic and operational objectives by threatening the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners with nuclear strikes?
b. Can deter China from launching nuclear attacks with these systems in a future regional conflict?
c. If deterrence fails, how can the United States defeat this capability and restore deterrence?
3. What confidence-building and risk reduction approaches can reduce escalation risks and/or limit the threat to the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies posed by these systems?
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