Sept. 13, 2023

The Role of Special Operations Forces in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

With their global presence, reach, and capabilities, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) are critical for competing and winning in the WMD-infected security environment. Core SOF capabilities work to shape the operating environment in the current “steady state” landscape in a manner that serves to deter, dissuade, and frustrate adversaries from pursuing or acquiring WMD.

Aug. 18, 2023

2023 Biodefense Posture Review

The Biodefense Posture Review was a whole of DOD effort to develop guidance to achieve National Defense Strategy priorities and address biological threats - especially those with strategic consequences for the U.S. military.

April 30, 2023

How Emerging Technologies Become Emerging Threats: Workshop Report

Identifying how emerging technologies contribute to, or constitute emerging threats can better prepare society to take the appropriate actions to mitigate risks and possibly lead to measures that ensure better governance. The participants of a workshop devoted to examining this question found that social, cultural, political, economic, and other factors contribute to how emerging technologies may become emerging threats. This paper summarizes these discussions and conclusions.

April 12, 2023

2023 Annual Symposium

The National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) invites you to join us on 14 June 2023 for the virtual Annual CSWMD Symposium, titled "WMD in the Decisive Decade." 

March 15, 2023

Designating North Korean Nuclear Weapons as Proliferation Risks: A Proposal for Forestalling Major Power Conflicts in the Event of North Korea's Internal Collapse

A potential North Korean internal collapse would pose enormous challenges to South Korea, to include the risk of catalyzing a major U.S.-China crisis. Creative diplomacy by Seoul, however, could lay the groundwork for all three states to designate North Korea's nuclear weapons as "proliferation risks" within a notional future crisis, providing common ground for Washington and Beijing--who have worked together on key nonproliferation initiatives in the past--to tacitly cooperate on (or at least de-conflict) efforts to address the security threats posed by Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal within a dynamic internal conflict environment.

Feb. 16, 2023

China's Theater-Range, Dual-Capable Delivery Systems: Integrated Deterrence and Risk Reduction Approaches to Counter a Growing Threat

China has engaged in a dramatic buildup of its nuclear forces over the past decade. While much of the attention on China’s new nuclear arsenal has focused on its development and expansion of its strategic nuclear triad, this growth has also included significant numbers of theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems. These forces are not capable of reaching the U.S. mainland but can range U.S. and allied forces and bases across strategically significant swathes of the Indo-Pacific.

Dec. 23, 2022

The PLA’s Strategic Support Force and AI Innovation

The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF) is has a number of advantages that will allow it to help China achieve its aim of becoming a global leader in AI, including an environment that promotes innovation, its explicit charge for innovation, and leadership's support for “intelligentization”, but also notable weaknesses, including attracting and retaining a high-quality high-tech workforce, China’s inability to fabricate advanced semiconductor chips domestically, and the PLA’s limited combat experience and the consequent dearth of associated “ground truth” data. The SSF will be a significant player in the PLA’s adoption of AI, but the authors do not see it as playing a central role in the PLA’s overall AI innovation and development.

Nov. 15, 2022

Through a Glass, A Little Less Darkly: North Korean Nuclear Command and Control in Light of Recent Developments

North Korea’s new nuclear policy law points to the dilemma Kim Jong Un faces as he tries to reconcile competing strategic objectives: maximizing the deterrence value and operational utility of his growing nuclear capability while preserving his absolute political authority. This article discusses North Korea’s approach to nuclear command and control in the context of its unique governing system and political culture.

Sept. 16, 2022

North Korean Nuclear Command and Control: Alternatives and Implications

This study examines alternative approaches North Korea could take for command and control of its nuclear forces (NC2) as it makes critical choices on the type of nuclear strategy and posture it wishes to adopt. The report helps fill an important analytical gap in current assessments of North Korea, examines implications of North Korea’s choices for U.S. and South Korean deterrence strategies and defense planning, and helps shed light on the most recent announcements made by North Korea concerning its nuclear forces.

Aug. 30, 2022

Controlling Chemical Weapons in the New International Order

Mr. John Caves, CSWMD Distinguished Fellow, and Dr. Seth Carus, NDU Emeritus Distinguished Professor of National Security Policy examine the breakdown in consensus decision-making at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and place this development in the context of Russia, China, and Iran’s larger challenge to a rules-based international order. The article further considers how this dynamic may play out in the OPCW in the coming years and discusses how the United States can continue to use the Chemical Weapons Convention and OPCW to defend the international norm against chemical weapons while better protecting itself and its allies and partners from a greater chemical weapons threat.