Publications

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Category: Paul Bernstein

Jan. 27, 2021

China’s Hypersonic Weapons

Bernstein and Hancock identify potential strategic and operational issues that will need to be addressed as China's hypersonic capabilities mature.

Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition Oct. 26, 2020

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Strategic Deterrence, and Great Power Competition

Mr. Paul Bernstein and others examine the role of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in great power competition in the 2020 Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Strategic Assessment.

Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Strategic Posture in 2030 and Beyond Oct. 15, 2020

Toward an Integrated Strategic Deterrent

Mr. Paul Bernstein's article for the Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory explores the need for greater integration across the strategic forces toolkit as a means to strengthen deterrence and defense, the opportunities that exist to advance this goal, and obstacles that must be overcome to ensure progress

Dec. 13, 2019

Russia's Hypersonic Weapons

While Russian hypersonic weapons could pose problems for U.S. and NATO defense planning, their introduction in the near-term is not likely to fundamentally alter the existing balance of power or the prospects for strategic stability.

Sept. 20, 2019

Power Under Parity

Distinguished Research Fellow Paul Bernstein contributed his expertise to this report on strategic parity in an era of great power competition.

Aug. 29, 2017

Exploring the Requirements of Integrated Strategic Deterrence

The workshop sought to gain a deeper understanding of how a more integrated approach to capabilities, operational concepts and plans could deliver a stronger deterrence posture to meet the challenges posed by advanced nuclear-armed adversaries in future regional crisis and conflict.

March 10, 2016

Making Russia Think Twice About Nuclear Threats

On September 11, 2013, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, writing in The New York Times, issued “A Plea for Caution From Russia.” Putin sought to communicate directly with the American people, warning against U.S. and Western unilateral military action in Syria — in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against its own citizens —

March 9, 2016

Countering Russia’s Strategy for Regional Coercion and War

Much of the discussion since the 2014 Ukraine crisis began has focused on how Russia could exploit a local or regional political crisis (real or manufactured) tolaunch a military action that would result in a rapid fait accompli against one of the Baltic states (or elsewhere in eastern Europe), forcing NATO to weigh the costs and risks of a

Aug. 20, 2015

Putin's Russia and U.S. Defense Strategy

The workshop addressed two questions bearing on the development of U.S. and NATO strategy toward Russia.

June 1, 2012

Proliferation Risks of Civilian Nuclear Power Programs

The risks of nuclear proliferation—the further spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, technology, and expertise—derive in part from the technical characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle and the national and international management of fuel cycle activities. Civilian nuclear power plants themselves are not considered a high