Publications

Results:
Category: Paul Bernstein

Sept. 16, 2022

North Korean Nuclear Command and Control: Alternatives and Implications

This study examines alternative approaches North Korea could take for command and control of its nuclear forces (NC2) as it makes critical choices on the type of nuclear strategy and posture it wishes to adopt. The report helps fill an important analytical gap in current assessments of North Korea, examines implications of North Korea’s choices for U.S. and South Korean deterrence strategies and defense planning, and helps shed light on the most recent announcements made by North Korea concerning its nuclear forces.

June 28, 2021

Toward Nuclear and WMD Fluency in Professional Military Education

This article is one of the first products of CSWMD’s first WMD Educators Forum, which provided a venue for dialog and served as an accelerator for teaching methods and learning outcomes for WMD across the DoD. The article draws on recent experience in creating benchmarks for education on nuclear capabilities and concepts, and suggests how this can be done for other critical aspects of the WMD challenge.

Jan. 27, 2021

China’s Hypersonic Weapons

Bernstein and Hancock identify potential strategic and operational issues that will need to be addressed as China's hypersonic capabilities mature.

Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition Oct. 26, 2020

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Strategic Deterrence, and Great Power Competition

Mr. Paul Bernstein and others examine the role of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in great power competition in the 2020 Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Strategic Assessment.

Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Strategic Posture in 2030 and Beyond Oct. 15, 2020

Toward an Integrated Strategic Deterrent

Mr. Paul Bernstein's article for the Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory explores the need for greater integration across the strategic forces toolkit as a means to strengthen deterrence and defense, the opportunities that exist to advance this goal, and obstacles that must be overcome to ensure progress

Dec. 13, 2019

Russia's Hypersonic Weapons

While Russian hypersonic weapons could pose problems for U.S. and NATO defense planning, their introduction in the near-term is not likely to fundamentally alter the existing balance of power or the prospects for strategic stability.

Sept. 20, 2019

Power Under Parity

Distinguished Research Fellow Paul Bernstein contributed his expertise to this report on strategic parity in an era of great power competition.

Aug. 29, 2017

Exploring the Requirements of Integrated Strategic Deterrence

The workshop sought to gain a deeper understanding of how a more integrated approach to capabilities, operational concepts and plans could deliver a stronger deterrence posture to meet the challenges posed by advanced nuclear-armed adversaries in future regional crisis and conflict.

March 10, 2016

Making Russia Think Twice About Nuclear Threats

On September 11, 2013, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, writing in The New York Times, issued “A Plea for Caution From Russia.” Putin sought to communicate directly with the American people, warning against U.S. and Western unilateral military action in Syria — in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against its own citizens —

March 9, 2016

Countering Russia’s Strategy for Regional Coercion and War

Much of the discussion since the 2014 Ukraine crisis began has focused on how Russia could exploit a local or regional political crisis (real or manufactured) tolaunch a military action that would result in a rapid fait accompli against one of the Baltic states (or elsewhere in eastern Europe), forcing NATO to weigh the costs and risks of a

Aug. 20, 2015

Putin's Russia and U.S. Defense Strategy

The workshop addressed two questions bearing on the development of U.S. and NATO strategy toward Russia.

June 1, 2012

Proliferation Risks of Civilian Nuclear Power Programs

The risks of nuclear proliferation—the further spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, technology, and expertise—derive in part from the technical characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle and the national and international management of fuel cycle activities. Civilian nuclear power plants themselves are not considered a high

April 1, 2010

The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction

In a 1999 interview, Ashton Carter, a key figure in helping to create and implement the threat reduction program initiated by Senators Sam Nunn (D–GA) and Richard Lugar (R–IN), recalled four visits between 1994 and 1996 to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) base in Pervomaysk, Ukraine. Planted in the soil of this base were the most

Oct. 1, 2009

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, Looking Ahead

This Occasional Paper traces the general evolution of the countering WMD enterprise in the Clinton and Bush administrations and anticipates some of the major WMD challenges that lie ahead.

May 1, 2008

International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

This Occasional Paper examines the role, manifestations, and challenges of international cooperation to combat the weapons of mass destruction threat and poses important questions for future leaders to address in moving international cooperation forward in this area.

April 1, 2007

The Future Nuclear Landscape

This Occasional Paper examines aspects of the contemporary and emerging international security environment that the authors believe will define the future nuclear landscape and identifies some associated priorities for policymakers.