Sept. 23, 2024

China's Theater-Range, Dual-Capable Delivery Systems: Integrated Deterrence and Risk Reduction Approaches to Counter a Growing Threat

China has engaged in a dramatic buildup of its nuclear forces over the past decade. While much of the attention on China’s new nuclear arsenal has focused on its development and expansion of its strategic nuclear triad, this growth has also included significant numbers of theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems. These forces are not capable of reaching the U.S. mainland but can range U.S. and allied forces and bases across strategically significant swathes of the Indo-Pacific.

June 28, 2024

Implementing the Chairman's Guidance on Experiential Learning in PME Classrooms

In 2020, the CJCS called for more "experiential learning" in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) classrooms. Within this April 2024 Joint Force Quarterly article, Dr Justin Anderson and Dr Paige Price provide an example of a simulated arms control negotiation for use in courses addressing major power competition, deterrence, adversary strategic objectives, and other related topics.

June 12, 2024

Arms Control Monitoring Regimes

The successful negotiation of arms control agreements generally requires each participant’s implementation of, and compliance with, the terms of the agreement. Various types of monitoring are often directly codified within the agreement; for example, a number of past and present agreements include monitoring regimes featuring carefully regulated,

Feb. 6, 2024

Presentation: “Russian and Other (Dis)information Undermining WMD Arms Control: Considerations for NATO”

DOPSR Cleared talking points of presentation "Russian and Other (Dis)information Undermining WMD Arms Control: Considerations for NATO” given to the NATO Committe by Sarah Jacobs Gamberini & Justin Anderson on Proliferation at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

March 15, 2023

Designating North Korean Nuclear Weapons as Proliferation Risks: A Proposal for Forestalling Major Power Conflicts in the Event of North Korea's Internal Collapse

A potential North Korean internal collapse would pose enormous challenges to South Korea, to include the risk of catalyzing a major U.S.-China crisis. Creative diplomacy by Seoul, however, could lay the groundwork for all three states to designate North Korea's nuclear weapons as "proliferation risks" within a notional future crisis, providing common ground for Washington and Beijing--who have worked together on key nonproliferation initiatives in the past--to tacitly cooperate on (or at least de-conflict) efforts to address the security threats posed by Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal within a dynamic internal conflict environment.

March 14, 2022

Allied Assurance and Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

While U.S. extended deterrence capabilities within the Indo-Pacific remain robust for the purposes of deterring regional nuclear-armed adversaries, the article written by CSWMD's Dr. Justin Anderson recommends Washington devote additional time and attention to the assurance of key regional allies increasingly concerned about the rising strength of China -- and the long-term reliability of the United States. Better communicating the enduring importance of U.S. nuclear security commitments represents a key step toward convincing allies to bolster their diplomatic and defense cooperation with Washington as part of broader efforts to develop truly integrated deterrence strategies in the Indo-Pacific.

May 25, 2021

Arms Control in Today’s (Dis)Information Environment Part II

Dr. Justin Anderson's recent article is the second in a series of papers by Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Fellows examining Arms Control in Today’s (Dis)information Environment. The goal of the series is to contribute to a discussion about how disinformation could play a role in future arms control treaties and agreements.

Feb. 25, 2021

Deterring, Countering, and Defeating Conventional-Nuclear Integration

Dr. Justin Anderson and Lt Col James R. McCue, USAF, propose a three-part framework using the Department of Defense’s Deterrence Operations – Joint Operating Concept (deny benefits, impose costs, and encourage restraint) to bolster US and allied deterrence postures in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition Oct. 26, 2020

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Strategic Deterrence, and Great Power Competition

Mr. Paul Bernstein and others examine the role of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in great power competition in the 2020 Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Strategic Assessment.

March 25, 2020

Infodemic

In their article in Inkstick, Dr. Justin Anderson and Ms. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini examine the daunting challenge of attempting to halt the spread of misinformation (erroneous information) and disinformation (deliberately false information) about the coronavirus (COVID-19).

July 23, 2019

The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-bound Success

This article discusses the changing dynamics that led first Moscow and then Washington to reevaluate the merit of the INF Treaty. It concludes that the treaty's relative rigidity may play a key role in its undoing and suggests that future arms control negotiations develop more flexible and resilient mechanisms of review, dispute resolution, and verification.

Jan. 23, 2018

Negotiating a Nuclear "Code of Conduct"

The NPT five lack shared norms of nuclear behavior. Pursuing a nuclear code of conduct could resolve that and help increase both dialogue and stability.

Oct. 19, 2017

Competitive Symposium 2017

Washington, DC — The Competitive Symposium held on 2-3 March 2017 is a new initiative of the WMD Center designed to leverage the three components of the Center’s mandate together with our WMD expertise on staff and growing cadre of next-generation military and civilian leaders with knowledge of the WMD threat—the Program for Emerging Leaders (PEL) and the Countering WMD Graduate Fellows Program.

March 20, 2017

March Issue, Arms Control Today: "Deter and Downsize: A Paradigm Shift for Nuclear Arms Control"

The nuclear triad approach to nuclear arms control deserves recognition for playing an important role in limiting and ultimately contributing to the reduction of their respective deployed nuclear forces, but it is unable to address the nuclear competition within the present geostrategic environment, where multiple states view nuclear forces as critically important to their long-term security. If nuclear arms control is to play a key role in preventing friction between nuclear powers and reducing nuclear risks in the 21st century, there needs to be a shift in focus and an expansion in participants.

Sept. 1, 2016

Law of War Considerations In Fielding Nuclear Forces

The status of nuclear weapons within international law was a subject of intense debate during last fall’s UN General Assembly First Committee session. State supporters of the humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons pressed for resolutions asserting the illegality of nuclear weapons and sought to build support for the near-term negotiation of a

May 11, 2016

Limited and Lawful Hammers

The article by Gro Nystuen and Kjolv Egeland in Arms Control Today titled, “A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law” begins by citing language from the “Conclusion” of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT RevCon, noting it “referred for the first time in [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)] history to the ‘catastrophic humanitarian

March 16, 2016

Applying Jus in Bello to the Nuclear Deterrent

On December 7, 2015, the UN General Assembly passed A/RES/70/50, titled “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free-world,” by a vote of 132-36. Co-sponsored by Austria and several other states central to the “Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons” movement, the resolution charges that any use of nuclear weapons would inherently violate the